

















































































































                                                1	Joel	Kurth,	“Detroit	Neighborhood	Plea:	we	want	squatters.	The	Detroit	News.	September	17,	2015.	<http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2015/09/17/detroit-neighborhood-plea-want-squatters/32558019/>	Accessed	6/2/16.		
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Future	City	2013:11;	Orr	2013:88)	and	over	78	thousand	abandoned	houses	and	buildings	(Detroit	Blight	Removal	Task	Force	2014).2		 The	process	of	urban	depopulation	increases	the	amount	of	interstitial	social	space	where	illegal	activities	can	take	place.	Simultaneously,	strained	municipal	budgets	compromise	service	provision	and	diminish	authority	oversight.	Do-it-yourself	tactics	for	improving	urban	life	and	illegal	methods	for	survival	are	prevalent	in	this	context.	More	stable	residents	mow	vacant	city	lots	or	tear	down	vacant	structures	on	their	block,	while	homeless	residents	illegally	occupy	abandoned	houses	for	shelter.	The	local	context	also	influences	the	meaning	of	law	in	everyday	life,	and	the	understanding	and	practice	of	legality	by	residents	(Mezey	2001).	Thus	the	“life	of	the	law”	–	the	way	residents	experience	and	understand	the	law	as	they	choose	to	invoke,	avoid,	or	resist	it	(Ewick	and	Silbey	1992,	737)	–	is	presumably	different	under	conditions	of	urban	decline	than	in	other	settings;	and	other	structural	features,	normative	frameworks,	and	everyday	practices	increase	in	significance	relative	to	the	law.		 This	project	studies	the	illegal	use	of	private	property	—	practices	like	squatting,	farming,	and	scrapping	—	in	the	city	of	Detroit	in	order	to	answer	two	main	questions:	“How	do	the	conditions	of	urban	decline	impact	property	relations?”	and,	“What	everyday	factors	influence	outcomes	typically	associated	with	property	rights	and	legal	property	ownership?”	The	case	of	Detroit	is	apt	for	investigating	both	questions,	insofar	as	it	is	an	archetypal	case	of	U.S.	urban	decline,	and	the	conditions	therein	create	a	natural	












                                                4	See,	for	example,	(Mukhija	2005)	for	a	discussion	of	“the	commons”:	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	(Hardin	1968),	the	inverse	commons	(Raymond	2001),	the	comedy	of	the	commons	(Rose	1994),	and	the	tragedy	of	the	anti-commons	(Heller	1998).	
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from	property	maintenance	and	upkeep	(Haurin,	Dietz,	and	Weinberg	2013;	Rohe	and	Stewart	1996).										 The	emotional	dimension	of	investment	is	heightened	for	property	owners	who	reside	in	(owner-occupants)	or	who	regularly	use	(business	owners,	for	example)	their	property	over	landlords	who	rent	land	or	property	to	others	(Friedrichs	and	Blasius	2009).	Having	a	stake	in	the	place	of	which	their	property	is	a	part	links	homeownership	with	increased	engagement	in	community	organizations	(DiPasquale	and	Glaeser	1999;	Harkness	and	Newman	2002;	McCabe	2013;	Rossi	and	Weber	1996).	Homeowners	are	also	more	likely	to	get	to	know	and	positively	interact	with	their	neighbors	(Fischer	1982;	Rohe	and	Stewart	1996;	Sampson	1991)	and	to	reside	in	the	property	longer	(Dietz	and	Haurin	2003;	Friedrichs	and	Blasius	2009;	Green	and	White	1997;	Rohe	and	Stewart	1996).5										 Research	also	finds	widespread	ideological	commitments	to	private	ownership	in	everyday	discourse.	Edward	Goetz	and	Mara	Sidney	(1994)	studied	conflict	between	inner	city	property	owners	and	renters	over	neighborhood	development	plans	in	the	Twin	Cities.	Dominating	this	conflict	was	what	they	called	an	ideology	of	property	suggesting,	“that	neighborhood	decline	is	the	result	of	the	continued	development	of	rental	housing”	(331).	This	ideology	of	property	was	based	in	the	belief	that	renters	–	lacking	the	strong	economic	incentive	of	ownership	–	have	less	of	a	stake	in	the	community,	and	could	not	therefore	be	as	committed	to	improving	the	quality	of	life	in	the	neighborhood	(324-325).	Similarly,	in	her	recent	study	of	the	relationship	between	rental	housing	and	perceptions	of	































City:	 DETROIT	 PORTLAND	Population	 677,116	 619,360	Square	Mile	Area	 142.87	 145	Ratio	 4.7	thousand	people	per	square	mile	 4.3	thousand	people	per	square	mile			 Detroit’s	“problems”	are	not	as	simple	as	the	ratio	of	population-size	to	square-mileage.	Instead,	the	direction	of	the	population	change	is	a	more	accurate	root	of	the	problem	than	fit:	Detroit’s	population	has	declined	nearly	three-fold,	while	Portland’s	has	been	steadily	increasing.	The	term	“decline”	is	thus	apt	for	linguistically	pointing	towards	1)	the	process	of	population	decline	that	is	caused	by	and	causes	a	variety	of	social	problems,	and	2)	the	decline	in	quality	of	life	that	is	associated	with	this	population	decrease.	The	latter	is	impetus	for	more	comprehensively	understanding	the	former:	if	population	decline	were	associated	with	a	return	to	idyllic	small-town	comforts	for	remaining	residents,	this	urban	process	would	not	be	so	pressing	for	social	scientists	and	urban	planners	to	understand.8	Thus,	while	I	regret	that	the	term	“urban	decline”	has	a	pejorative	connotation,	it	is	still	appropriate	for	evoking	the	object	of	study	this	term	signifies:	the	multi-faceted	process	of	urban	transformation	and	the	accompanying	host	of	social	problems	that	plague	many	cities	across	the	U.S.	(not	to	mention	the	world)	that	have	experienced	or	are	experiencing	a	meaningful	decrease	in	population	size.	

















                                                9	Logan	and	Molotch	(1987)	argue	the	state	protects	the	exchange	interests	of	entrepreneurs,	which	are	often	in	conflict	with	urban	residents	“use	interests”	in	property.	My	point	here	is	that	the	hegemony	of	liberal	conceptions	of	legally-protected	private	property	as	an	individual	and	social	good	persists	throughout	everyday	meanings	of	private	property	and	informs	macro-level	regulatory	strategies	by	state	actors,	not	that	their	interests	in	property	are	the	same.	
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demonstrated	about	property’s	relationship	to	social	phenomena	or	individual	outcomes	of	property	relations	do	not	translate	into	a	context	like	Detroit.	The	metaphorical	and	physical	space	for	informal	social	action	that	a	city	like	Detroit	provides	is	also	akin	to	a	natural	experiment,	wherein	the	legal-economic	factors	that	typically	property	relations	are	reduced	and	other	non-legal	factors	that	influence	property	come	to	the	fore.	Finally,	speculating	the	impact	that	“remedies”	will	have	for	residents	in	declining	cities	requires	understanding	current	conditions	of	urban	life	in	such	places.	Gentrification	research	has,	for	example,	provided	social	scientists	with	a	model	for	how	an	influx	of	capital	into	an	urban	area	might	impact	existing	renters	and	longtime	homeowners	(Zukin	1987).	But	we	do	not	yet	know	how	the	strategies	for	urban	transformation	–	new	and	old	–	will	impact	residents	of	a	declining	city.	While	Detroit	has	become	a	poster-child	for	the	crisis	of	urban	decline	because	of	its	scale	and	severity,	it	is	very	recently	being	lauded	as	on	the	road	to	recovery,	signified	by	glimmers	of	gentrification	and	the	first	increase	in	the	white	population	since	1950.10	Key	to	these	recent	changes	are	plans,	policies,	and	laws	that	seek	to	“handle”	all	of	the	vacant	and	abandoned	property	in	the	city	by	increasing	regulation	of	the	informal,	illegal	uses	of	property.	How	might	the	impact	of	these	new	regulations	be	influenced	by	the	variation	in	informal/illegal	property	use?	What	are	these	informal/illegal	practices	like?	And	what	non-legal	factors	exist	that	may	influence	the	ability	for	informal	actors	to	comply	with	new	regulations?		













                                                11	These	counts	indicate	how	many	times	I	used	each	different	interview	guide,	thus	one	person	was	sometimes	interviewed	as	both	a	resident	and	institutional	actor	(for	example).	







CATEGORY	 FORM	 PRACTICE	 COUNT	
Occupation	 Squatting/	Homesteading	 Occupying	houses	or	other	buildings	as	primary	form	of	residence/shelter	 20	Occupation	 Farming	 Growing	food,	plants,	etc	on	vacant	lots	for	eating,	sharing	and/or	selling	 14	
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rights	protect	owners’	exclusive	power	over	property	as	a	“benefit	stream”	and	all	of	the	resources,	income,	or	uses	it	provides.	Urban	scholarship	often	focuses	on	“space”	and	“place”	instead	of	legally	defined	property	per	se.	But	from	a	spatio-legal	perspective,	property	mediates	proximal	human	relationships.	Private	property	in	urban	areas	allocates	power,	creates	and	reflects	inequalities,	and	adjudicates	access	to	urban	space.	Because	real	property	is	spatially	rooted,	it	mediates	relationships	among	individuals	in	a	given	proximity	and	their	relationships	to	the	resources	of	the	city.	Legal	rights	to	property	in	highly	sought-after,	gentrified	neighborhoods	afford	access	to	the	resources	that	neighborhood	is	proximal	to:	quality	schools,	retail	choices,	safe	spaces,	efficient	transit,	etc.	In	highly	segregated	neighborhoods	or	spaces	of	concentrated	disadvantage,	residents	are	hindered	by	the	limited	resources	proximal	to	the	property	to	which	they	have	access.	In	this	dissertation,	the	term	“property	relations”	refers	to	how	people	relate	to	the	physical	space	of	property,	and	to	other	residents	around	them	(see	(Blomley	2004)	for	further	discussion).		 Property	relations	are	typically	regulated	by	the	enforcement	of	property	laws.	Municipalities	are	increasingly	entrepreneurial	in	their	governance	structures	insofar	as	they	cater	to	the	interests	of	capital,	and	seek	to	ensure	functioning	markets	and	stable	or	rising	property	values	(Harvey	1989).	In	many	shrinking	cities,	property	values	have	declined	and	legal	property	regulation	is	a	low	priority	for	municipal	budgets	that	are	strained	due	to	decreasing	tax	bases	(Beauregard	2009;	Immergluck	2011;	Pallagst	et	al.	2009).	Urban	decline	has	impacted	cities	in	ways	that	undermine	conceptualizations	of	property	as	a	legally	regulated,	high-demand	commodity	that	is	a	source	of	economic	appreciation.	
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	 This	chapter	introduces	the	conditions	of	urban	Detroit	and	explains	how	urban	decline	influence	property	relations.	Declining	cities	share	two	main	features:	significant	population	decline	and	structural	shifts	that	destabilize	the	city’s	economic	base	(Bernt	2015).	In	Detroit,	four	inter-related	correlates	of	urban	decline	purport	to	alter	dominant	ideas	about	how	property	functions	in	the	urban	context.	First,	due	to	drastic	population	decline,	there	is	a	plethora	of	opportunity	for	illegal	occupation	and	deconstruction	of	private	property.	Second,	there	is	essentially	no	functioning	property	market	in	most	neighborhoods.	Third,	the	city	lacks	the	resources	to	effectively	oversee,	maintain,	and	keep	accurate	record	of	property,	which	impedes	the	ability	to	protect	property	rights.	And	fourth,	there	is	little	risk	of	punishment	for	illegal	appropriation	because	the	state	has	few	resources	and	little	push	to	enforce	property	rights	(and	because	authorities	often	do	not	want	to	enforce	them).	These	conditions	challenge	conventional	understandings	of	property	as	a	mediator	of	social	relationships	that	is	regulated	by	law	and/or	economic	incentives.	Instead,	property	is	still	a	mediator	of	urban	social	relationships	but	1)	the	law’s	role	in	this	mediation,	and	2)	explanations	that	rely	on	economic	incentives	to	explain	individual	behavior	with	regard	to	property,	are	not	necessarily	accurate	frameworks/narratives	for	explaining	urban	social	phenomena.		
Vacancy	and	Neighborhood	Abandonment		 Detroit’s	population	decline	has	resulted	in	78,506	blighted,	vacant	houses	and	buildings	(Blight	Task	Force	2014),12	and	over	20	square	miles	of	vacant	land	just	owned	
                                                12	This	count	refers	to	built	structures	“needing	intervention”	that	fit	the	definition	of	blight	according	to	Michigan	law	(Blight	Task	Force	2014:13).	
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by	the	city	(roughly	the	size	of	Manhattan)	within	its	139	square	mile	footprint	(Detroit	Future	City	2013:11;	Orr	2013:88).	White	flight	began	a	process	of	depopulation	in	the	1950s	(Sugrue	1996;	Steinmetz	2009)	that	has	since	left	a	city	built	for	two	million	struggling	to	hold	together	with	688,000	remaining	residents	and	a	deteriorated	built	environment.		 In	cities	like	Detroit,	many	property	owners	seeking	to	leave	the	city	are	unable	to	sell	because	there	is	so	little	demand	for	property,	and	instead	take	a	financial	hit	and	walk	away	from	their	homes	or	businesses,	leaving	them	to	foreclosure	by	the	bank	if	they	had	a	mortgage	or	by	the	city	for	non-payment	of	taxes	(Hackworth	2014:3).	Within	these	conditions,	profit-seeking	landlords	purchase	cheap	properties	to	rent	out,	but	make	few	repairs	and	let	them	deteriorate	over	time	(Akers	2013;	Hackworth	2014;	Mallach	2014).	Homeowners	who	have	stayed	often	find	it	hard	to	maintain	their	houses	in	the	face	of	plummeting	property	values	and	a	bleak	employment	environment	(for	general	discussion	of	such	conditions,	see	(Hackworth	2014;	Salins	1980;	Sternlieb	and	Burchell	1973;	White	1986)).	As	a	result,	much	of	Detroit’s	housing	stock	is	in	poor	condition,	and	empty	properties	are	often	completely	decimated	by	scrappers	who	pounce	on	them	within	days	or	even	hours	of	residents	leaving.		 At	the	street	level,	vacancy	rates	vary	greatly	from	block	to	block	and	between	different	neighborhoods	(for	lucid	description	of	some	of	these	conditions	see,	for	example,	Millington	2013;	Steinmetz	2008).	More	stable	areas	like	Midtown	or	some	parts	of	Southwest	have	few	vacant	houses	or	lots	and	look	like	neighborhoods	in	many	other	cities	with	older	housing	stock	(though	often	this	is	an	attempt	by	neighbors	to	maintain	the	air	of	occupancy	in	an	effort	to	prevent	further	blight,	see	Kinder	2014).	Other	neighborhoods,	




                                                13	http://www.freep.com/interactive/article/20130915/NEWS01/130801004/Detroit-Bankruptcy-history-1950-debt-pension-revenue	





                                                14	http://www.freep.com/article/20140221/NEWS01/302220027/city-services-and-plan-of-adjustment	
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Orr,	recommended	that	the	city	“urgently”	overhaul	to	their	technology	systems,15	since	outdated	methods	are	causing	confusion	and	inaccuracy,	and	ultimately	costing	the	city	money	(Orr	2013:73).	This	makes	the	benefits,	liabilities,	and	responsibilities	of	legal	ownership	difficult	and	costly	to	figure	out.		
----	Sub-Standard	Title	Transfers		 Incomplete	or	unclear	records	are	also	a	result	of	the	kind	of	property	sales	common	in	Detroit.	A	quit-claim	deed	is	a	common	method	used	to	transfer	property	in	Detroit.	Unlike	warranty	deeds	more	commonly	used	in	real	estate	purchases,	a	quit-claim	deed	provides	no	guarantees	of	clear	title	on	a	property.	Because	no	title-guarantee	is	offered,	a	title	company	is	not	required	for	the	transaction	and	therefore	laymen	often	use	this	method	of	property	transfer.	What	this	means	is	that	in	Detroit,	the	property	seller	does	not	have	to	prove	that	he	or	she	has	a	clear	property	title	to	be	selling	–	the	seller	may	not	even	legally	own	the	property	or	have	any	right	to	be	selling	it.	Similar	problems	arise	with	land-contracts,	where	the	buyer	enters	into	an	agreement	to	pay	the	seller	increments	over	time	until	they	have	purchased	the	property.	Adding	to	confusion,	with	the	types	of	property	transactions	that	do	not	involve	a	licensed	realtor,	title	company,	or	other	institution	to	oversee	the	process,	property	title	transfers	may	never	be	registered	with	the	city.		
                                                15	The	City	urgently	needs	to	upgrade	or	replace	the	following	IT	systems,	among	others:	payroll;	financial;	budget	development;	property	information	and	assessment;	income	tax;	and	Detroit	Police	Department	operating	system	(Orr	2013,	19).	
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----	Property	Inheritance		 Similarly	confusing	situations	arise	when	a	property	owner	in	Detroit	dies.	Sometimes	the	heir	to	the	property	simply	does	not	want	the	house	and	never	takes	possession	of	it	(which	would	be	almost	unheard	of	in	a	location	with	high	property	values).	Other	times,	a	property	owner	does	not	have	a	will	specifying	to	whom	ownership	of	the	property	will	be	transferred.	The	property	ends	up	in	a	legal-limbo	situation	called	probate.	This	requires	the	state	to	determine	the	legal	heir,	but	with	a	city	government	like	Detroit’s	that	is	underfunded,	a	legal	heir	to	the	property	may	not	be	determined	in	a	timely	manner,	if	at	all.		
----	Small	Tax	Base;	High	Tax	Rates		 Detroit’s	tight	budget	is	in	large	part	due	to	decades	of	decreasing	tax	base	as	residents	and	businesses	fled	the	city.	Decreasing	property	values	and	fewer	residents	mean	less	revenue	for	the	city,16	yet	high	tax	rates	that	are	generally	double	the	U.S.	average	(Lincoln	Institute	of	Land	Policy	and	Minnesota	Taxpayers	Association	2012)	mean	remaining	residents	often	find	it	hard	to	pay	their	taxes.	Only	53%	of	property	owners	in	the	city	paid	their	2011	property	taxes:	the	city	was	owed	$131	million	that	year	(Orr	2013:81).	The	tax	foreclosure	process	is	supposed	to	take	three	years	(for	detailed	discussion	of	tax	foreclosure	in	Detroit	see	(Dewar,	Seymour,	and	Drut		2014),	but	at	times	seven	or	more	years	may	pass	before	the	city	takes	possession.	This	lag	means	that	a	homeowner	may	think	her	property	has	been	foreclosed	and	move	out,	but	the	city	has	not	
                                                16	From	2007-2010	alone,	Detroit’s	average	house	value	dropped	40	percent,	and	from	2000-2010	the	city	lost	over	25	percent	of	its	population	(Hackworth	2014:23).	
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yet	taken	possession;	or	conversely	that	the	city	has	foreclosed	a	property	but	the	occupant	is	unaware	or	refuses	to	vacate.	The	properties	transferred	to	municipal	ownership	via	tax	foreclosure	are	predominately	worth	less	than	the	accumulated	tax	bills	owed	(Hackworth	2014:3).	Because	of	this	process,	the	city	is	the	largest	property	owner	in	Detroit,	owning	over	65,000	properties.	However,	lack	of	funds	and	personnel	often	makes	securing	these	properties	difficult,	and	ensuring	they	stay	boarded	up	and	secured	impossible	–	even	the	fire	department	is	not	always	able	to	board	up	properties	after	a	fire,	as	they	are	legally	required.17		
Diminished	Property	Law	Enforcement		 The	city’s	tight	budget	means	it	is	ill	equipped	to	properly	regulate	and	enforce	laws	designed	to	hold	owners	accountable	for	their	properties.	It	is	technically	unlawful	for	homeowners	to	leave	their	properties	open	and	unsecured.	The	city	can	issue	citations	to	owners	whose	properties	are	a	“nuisance,”	but	the	city	rarely	collects	on	these	fines.18	City	officials	are	legally	permitted	to	evict	squatters	in	city-owned	property,	but	cannot	afford	the	court	fees.	Police	officers	can	cite	or	arrest	property	appropriators	for	violations	like	trespassing	or	vandalism,	but	seldom	do	so.	The	city’s	inability	to	adequately	handle	these	issues	means	that	property	owners	who	walk	away	do	so	with	little	to	no	repercussions	(see	Hackworth	2014:23-24),	and	appropriators	face	little	risk	for	their	activities.	But	lack	of	funding	is	not	the	only	reason	property	laws	are	not	reliably	enforced	in	Detroit.	
                                                17	Interview	with	Clarence,	July	15,	2013.	18	There	are	$50	million	outstanding	accounts	receivable	owed	to	the	Buildings,	Safety	Engineering	and	Environmental	Department	(Orr	2013:82).	
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----	Why	Authorities	Cannot	Always	Enforce	the	Law		 As	is	the	case	with	the	city	government	as	a	whole,	the	police	force	is	severely	underfunded	and	overburdened.	Detroit’s	police	force	has	undergone	severe	cuts	in	staff	and	funding,	losing	40%	of	their	manpower	over	the	last	ten	years	(Orr	2013:14).	In	2011,	Detroit	only	“cleared”	8.7%	of	reported	crimes	(Orr	2013:9).19	In	2012,	Detroit	was	considered	the	most	violent	city	in	America,	with	the	highest	violent	crime	rate	for	cities	with	over	200,000	people	and	a	violent	crime	rate	five	times	the	national	average	(Orr	2013:9).	In	2013,	the	average	response	time	in	Detroit	for	“priority	one”	calls	was	58	minutes	(Orr	2013:13).	Stories	abound	of	citizens	waiting	two	hours	for	police	to	respond	to	911	calls,	or	of	the	police	just	never	showing	up.	Detroit’s	police	force	is	overwhelmed	by	high	crime	rates,	underfunded,	and	suffers	from	low	morale.	They	have	experienced	a	high	turnover	rate	of	police	chiefs	–	five	in	the	last	five	years	–	and	are	forced	to	rely	on	aging	and	inadequate	equipment.	Officers	report	not	being	able	to	respond	to	911	calls	because	available	squad	cars	will	not	start.20	These	conditions	mean	that	calls	about	illegal	property	appropriation	in	the	city	of	Detroit	are	very	low	priority	for	police	officers.		 Property	laws	can	also	be	difficult	to	enforce	when	legal	owners	are	not	reliably	present.	The	laws	pertaining	to	squatting	are	also	confusing.	If	the	police	can	ascertain	that	a	person	has	broken	into	a	property	illegally,	they	can	be	charged	with	several	criminal	offenses,	such	as	trespass,	breaking	and	entering,	or	intent	to	harm.	However,	if	a	resident	
                                                19	For	comparison,	Pittsburgh	clears	34.0%,	Milwaukee	23.3%,	St.	Louis	23.5%,	and	Cleveland	11.4%	(Orr	2013:9).	20	Interviews	with	Isaac	and	Cedric,	August	2,	2013.	
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calls	911	in	Detroit	to	report	that	someone	has	illegally	broken	into	a	vacant	property,	it	falls	into	the	category	of	low-priority	because	it	is	not	life	threatening.	Most	often,	the	police	are	not	able	to	get	to	the	scene	of	such	a	break-in	quickly	enough	to	ascertain	that	the	individual	entered	without	permission	and	is	therefore	trespassing.	If	a	squatter	has	the	chance	to	set	up	residency	–	which	may	include,	for	example,	moving	in	personal	possessions,	having	mail	sent	to	the	property,	or	having	the	locks	changed	–	then	the	police	cannot	immediately	prove	that	a	break-in	has	happened	nor	ascertain	that	the	person	is	occupying	the	property	illegally.		 Without	the	ability	to	judge	whether	or	not	an	occupant	has	broken	into	a	property	or	entered	without	permission,	the	issue	becomes	a	civil	matter.	Only	the	legal	owner	(or	agent	of	the	legal	owner)	of	a	property	can	try	to	evict	an	occupant	through	civil	court.	Given	that	many	owners	of	vacant	properties	have	given	up	and	walked	away	from	them,	it	makes	sense	that	they	are	not	willing	or	interested	in	spending	the	time	and	money	to	go	to	court	and	pursue	an	eviction.	And	the	city	does	not	have	the	resources	to	evict	illegal	occupants	from	city-owned	properties	either.		 Lack	of	funding	and	resources	is	a	partial	explanation	for	why	city	authorities	do	not	reliably	enforce	property	laws.	Quentin,	who	oversees	thousands	of	city-owned	real	estate,	says	that	he	no	longer	has	the	resources	to	ensure	that	every	property	the	city	takes	possession	of	has	been	vacated	and	properly	secured.	Regarding	his	job	he	said,	“I	mean	right	now	it’s	an	impossible	task.	You	just,	there’s	not	enough	money,	there’s	not	enough	resources,	there’s	not	enough	people.	We	just	basically	put	out	fires	now.	[short	laugh]	I	mean	that’s	it.”	Because	of	constrained	budgets	and	a	high	volume	of	city	owned	properties,	calls	made	to	the	city	to	report	squatters	or	other	forms	of	illegal	property	use	are	very	low	
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priority.	Quentin	explained	there	is	little	he	can	do	even	when	he	finds	out	there	are	squatters	in	a	property:	But	now	we	don’t	have	any	money	for	evictions	anymore,	so	I	mean	we	can	try	and	rob	Peter	to	pay	Paul	and	worst-case	scenario	when	people	are	just	really	out	of	control	in	the	neighborhood	I’ll	evict	somebody	every	now	and	then,	but	for	the	most	part,	there’s	nothing	we	can	do.			Quentin	expressed	the	fact	that	he	simply	does	not	have	the	resources	needed	to	do	his	job.	Similarly,	Clarence,	a	firefighter	and	Detroit	resident,	explained	that	the	police	are	often	unable	to	respond.	He	stood	behind	the	bar	in	his	basement	and	comically	acted	out	what	would	happen	if	he	tried	to	involve	the	police	with	a	scrapping	incident.	He	held	up	an	imaginary	walkie-talkie	to	his	mouth:	-	Uh	yeah	Central	Office	this	is	Squad	5…	I	got	a	scrapper	right	here…	He’s	yanking	everything	off	this	house	and	putting	it	in	a	god	damn	grocery	cart…	Will	you	please	send	me	a	scout?		-	Squad	five	we	have	no	scout	available…	is	there	any	danger	to	the	citizens	in	the	area?		-	Uh,	well	the	citizens	are	sitting	here	smoking	cigarettes	and	having	a	beer	with	-	(the	scrapper)…	there’s	no	danger.		-	Squad	five	please	stay	the	fuck	off	the	radio	until	you	get	a	good	run.		Clarence	set	down	his	imaginary	radio	and	looked	at	me	and	laughed,	then	said	seriously,	“Yes	ma’am,	you’re	not	going	to	get	any	help…	nobody’s	going	to,	I’m	sorry.”		
----	Why	Authorities	Do	Not	Always	Want	to	Enforce	the	Law		 While	constrained	budgets	and	resources	are	certainly	a	pervasive	issue	for	all	city	employees	trying	to	effectively	do	their	jobs,	it’s	not	the	only	factor	preventing	authorities	from	intervening.	Frank,	a	police	commander	and	Detroit	resident	explained:	
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It’s	just	that	nobody	really	cares,	so	they	don’t	worry	about	it	you	know…	I	mean	really,	if	I	had	the	resources…	if	I	had	more	police	than	I	have,	if	all	of	a	sudden	I	had	like	a	30	percent	increase	in	police	resources…	I	certainly	wouldn’t	use	them	to	go	in	there	and	encumber	people	to	tear	down	urban	farms	and	gardens	on	a	technical	violation	of	ownership	you	know.			 Another	city	employee,	Dean,	who	manages	the	city’s	40,000	vacant	lots	finds	himself	similarly	constrained	by	inadequate	resources	but	also	believes	that	taking	over	vacant	lots	can	keep	residents	in	the	city	precisely	because	it	deters	negative	activities	from	taking	place	on	their	block.	When	speaking	with	a	resident	who	wants	a	lot	that	is	not	available	for	purchase,	Dean	explained,	“I	tried	to	couch	it	in	terms	like,	‘I	don’t	suggest	this	and	this	is	not	legal,	but	some	people	have	just	fenced	in	the	lot…	and	I	can’t	recommend	that	you	do	that,	but	you	wouldn’t	be	the	first	one	to	do	it…	But	I	didn’t	tell	you	to	do	that	and	that	would	be	illegal’.”	Rather	than	try	to	enforce	the	law	at	all	costs,	Dean	encourages	use	of	vacant	lots	because	he	believes	it	is	more	beneficial	for	the	city.		 Another	key	point	to	consider	with	respect	to	how	Detroit	police	officers	and	other	city	authorities	respond	to	illegal	property	appropriation	is	that	most	of	these	officials	are	also	Detroit	residents.	They	know	all	too	well	how	difficult	the	conditions	of	life	in	Detroit	can	be	and	have	dealt	with	illegal	property	appropriation	in	their	neighborhoods.	As	one	police	officer	told	me,	“You’re	going	to	have	squatters,	might	as	well	be	good	ones.”21	Frank	and	other	authorities	recognize	that	the	illegal	use	of	property	can	benefit	the	city	and	consider	such	benefits	more	important	than	the	legality	of	the	practice.		
                                                21	Interview	with	Cedric,	August	2,	2013.	
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Property	Relations	in	Detroit		 Theoretical	and	empirical	explanations	regarding	the	outcomes	of	private	property	ownership	presume	that	enforcing	property	rights	is	a	high	priority	for	authorities	and	that	property	ownership	is	an	economic	(and	sometimes	emotional)	investment	(see	Chapter	1	for	detailed	explanation).	But	these	presumed	conditions	are	likely	not	the	same	in	declining	cities,	if	even	reliably	present	at	all,	because	the	common	features	of	declining	cities	impact	the	protection	of	property	rights,	the	enforcement	of	property	laws,	and	destabilize	functioning	property	markets.	Bernt	(2015:3)	reviews	varied	definitions	of	urban	decline	in	urban	scholarship,	and	explains	that	all	of	them	include	population	decline,	“macro-trends	in	urban	development”	such	as	suburbanization	or	economic	shifts,	and	an	associated	host	of	urban	problems	that	vary	in	degree	and	form	depending	on	local	context.		 These	common	features	of	urban	decline	mean	fewer	jobs	and	a	smaller	population,	which	reduces	demand	for	property	(housing,	commercial	and	production	sites).	These	factors	can	reduce	tax	revenue,	which	multiplies	the	burden	on	municipal	agencies	responsible	for	overseeing	and	maintaining	more	and	more	vacant	properties.	Constrained	budgets	exacerbate	the	impact	of	informal	or	even	illegal	property	sales	(which	likely	increase	as	property	values	decrease)	because	municipal	actors	cannot	keep	track	of	legal	property	owners	nor	hold	them	liable.	Lack	of	economic	opportunities	in	the	city	means	more	economically	unstable	residents	who	rely	on	informal	tactics	for	meeting	needs,	like	squatting	or	scrapping.	Yet	decreased	budgets	constrains	the	ability	for	authorities	to	regulate	the	increase	in	these	activities	and	enforce	property	laws.	Property’s	exchange	value	declines	and	the	market	for	property	deteriorates	because	of	lack	of	demand.	
 	 53 
	 The	state	lacks	the	resources	to	create	conditions	that	support	a	market	for	property,	e.g.	enforcing	property	rights	or	offering	incentives	for	investors.	The	state’s	inability	to	reliably	and	effectively	protect	property	rights	further	undermines	conventional	understandings	of	property	ownership:	owners	cannot	be	guaranteed	their	right	of	exclusion	over	property,	its	resources,	or	benefit	stream.	Informal	uses	increase,	and	so	do	informal	regulatory	regimes	by	residents.	Yet	despite	a	collapsed	property	market	and	inadequate	property	law	enforcement,	state	strategies	for	improving	neighborhoods	in	Detroit	still	privilege	private,	legal	ownership:	municipal	authorities	seek	to	sell	off	vacant	property,	presuming	that	legal	owners	are	better	for	neighborhoods	than	non-owners	(or	illegal	users)	and	that	private	ownership	leads	to	investment	and	thereby	benefits	the	city	(Akers	2013;	Dewar	et	al.	2014;	Hackworth	and	Nowakowski	2015;	Hackworth	2014).		 Property	laws	are	designed	to	protect	legally	defined	use	values	for	owners	(benefits	such	as	privacy	and	freedom,	purposes	such	as	home	or	business)	and	the	exchange	(or	market	value)	of	property.	In	conditions	of	stability	or	urban	growth,	there	is	congruence	of	value-systems	and	regulatory-systems.	One	way	of	thinking	about	what	has	happened	in	Detroit	is	that	this	congruity	of	value-systems	and	regulatory-systems	has	eroded.	Andrew	Herscher	(2012)	argues	that	property	in	Detroit	has	value	as	"unreal	estate,"	whereby	"urban	territory	has	slipped	through	the	literal	economy…	and	entered	other	structures	of	value,	including	but	not	limited	to	those	of	creative	survival,	exploration,	play,	desire,	escape,	and	imagination…	[and	becomes	part	of]	other	value	regimes,"	(2012:20).	Its	value	to	residents	and	role	in	social	relationships	is	not	determined	by	exchange	value	or	legally-define	use	values	–	instead,	alternative	use	values	come	to	the	
















































                                                26	See	Kinder	2014	for	a	similar	discussion	of	a	“tipping	point”	with	regard	to	vacant	properties.	
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improve	someone’s	bathroom	or	bricks	re-purposed	to	outline	a	pathway	through	a	resident’s	garden.	Second,	salvaging	puts	to	good	use	the	ruins	of	the	city	left	behind	by	negligent	property	owners.	Rather	than	ending	up	as	trash	if	and	when	a	blighted	property	is	finally	demolished,	salvagers	and	witnesses	extol	the	virtues	of	recycling	the	city.		 Fern,	a	homeowner	in	a	very	blighted	neighborhood,	says	he	and	his	wife	were	able	to	rehabilitate	their	dilapidated	house	almost	solely	by	using	salvaged	materials.	He	reflects	on	the	boundary	between	harming	and	caring:	“I	feel	better	about	it	once	the	house	is	down	and	I'm	like,	okay	I	made	the	right	decision.	You	know	like	I	don’t	want	to	be	stealing	wood	from	a	house	that’s	going	to	be	saved,	but	if	it’s	clear	that	it’s	not	going	to	be…	I	think	I'm	saving	it	from	being	demolished.”	Fern	thinks	its	better	to	utilize	salvageable	materials	before	they	are	demolished	by	the	city	and	thus	wasted.	One	homesteader	used	the	words	“save”,	“reclaim”	and	“recycle”	throughout	his	interview	to	talk	about	salvagers	who	take	left-behind	metal	from	buildings	or	wood	from	old	houses.	Jackie,	who	squats	with	her	20-year-old	son,	occasionally	scraps	materials	for	income.27	She	expresses	the	belief	that	they	are	helping	to	clean	up	their	neighborhood,	saying,	“Who	wants	to	look	at	all	the	shit,	you	know	what	I’m	saying?...	I	think	we’re	doing	the	city	a	favor	personally.”	Salvagers	and	scrappers	who	adhere	to	this	ethos	of	care	benefit	the	neighborhood	by	helping	to	clean	up	the	blight,	and	by	using	salvaged	materials	to	improve	other	houses	or	lots.		 Deconstructors	who	demolish	blighted	properties	demonstrate	care	for	the	community	by	making	the	streets	safer.	Many	blighted	houses	are	opportunities	for	






                                                28	Interview	with	Boris,	October	24,	2013.	29	Interview	with	Lamar,	November	4,	2013.	
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from	businesses	that	are	still	in	operation,	or	churches	that	are	still	used	are	considered	one	of	the	biggest	problems	facing	Detroit.		 In	seeking	to	address	illegal	property	appropriation	that	does	not	fulfill	an	ethos	of	care,	residents	employ	a	variety	of	tactics	to	try	to	remove	unwanted	squatters	from	their	neighborhoods	or	deter	harmful	deconstruction	practices.	Residents	may	hang	curtains	or	holiday	wreaths	in	empty	houses	to	make	them	look	occupied,	or	park	their	car	in	the	driveway	of	a	vacant	home.	In	one	neighborhood	in	my	study,	residents	had	constructed	a	text-alert	system,	so	that	they	could	try	to	intervene	when	unwanted	scrapping	was	taking	place	nearby.	If	squatters	move	into	a	property	and	are	not	upholding	an	ethos	of	care,	residents	may	call	the	utility	company	to	try	to	get	illegal	hookups	shut	off	and	make	it	harder	for	squatters	to	remain.	They	may	try	to	track	down	the	legal	owner	of	the	property	to	request	that	they	evict	the	squatter	(which	is	usually	unfruitful).	Residents	may	also	board	up	houses	they	feel	should	be	preserved	in	order	to	deter	scrappers.30	Or	residents	may	directly	confront	appropriators	and	explain	“the	rules.”	One	police	officer	I	interviewed	told	me	about	confronting	a	few	young	squatters	who	moved	onto	his	block:	“I	went	down	there	and	told	them,	‘Why	you	in	the	house?’	And	they	said,	‘oh	we	renting	the	house,’…	but	I	said,	‘I	know	you	don’t	because…	the	bank	owns	it	(and)	you	got	illegal	hookup,	but	I	told	them	to	cut	the	grass.’”	And	now?	“They’re	cutting	the	grass,”	he	told	me	with	satisfaction.31		
































































































































                                                34	Both	categories	of	appropriators	adhere	to	the	ethos	of	care	in	Chapter	3	–	the	belief	that	property	appropriation	is	just	or	right	so	long	as	one’s	actions	positively	impacts	the	physical	and	social	environment.	The	justificatory	narratives	here	articulate	the	source	of	a	larger	problem	in	Detroit,	and	how	individual	legal	violations	are	linked	with	these	systemic	obstacles.	
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the	conditions	authorities	have	created.	In	explaining	why	his	practices	are	justified,	Bond	displaces	responsibility	for	any	negative	impact	from	scrapping,	and	says,	People	shouldn't	blame	the	scrappers	that	the	city	look	bad.	They	should	blame	the	city-county35	government.	That's	what	I	say.	Scrappers	didn't	do	it.	City-county	done	did	it	-	stole	all	that	money,	made	all	the	people	leave	they	houses	and	all	them	homes	just	sitting	there.	That's	how	it	started…That's	how	people	wind	up	leaving;	forced	to	leave	because	they	ain't	paid	their	taxes.	Now	the	houses	are	sitting	there.	Who	own	it	-	the	bank	or	the	city	in	Michigan	owns	it?	Now	the	guys	sitting	around	here	looking	at	that	house,	ain’t	nobody	staying	here…we're	going	to	scrap	it.	That's	how	it	started.	It	would've	never	started	if	[the	government]	wouldn't	been	taking	all	that	money.	If	they	had	been	doing	the	right	thing	with	that	money…when	Washington	sent	them	millions	to	here	years	ago…	That	was	supposed	to	been	for	the	potholes	and	the	demolition.	They	supposed	to	demolition	all	these	homes	that	was	standing	there	‘cause	people	started	dumping	bodies	in	them.	They	supposed	to	tore	them	down	them	but	they	kept	stealing	the	money.			 Bond	blames	institutions	and	city	authorities	for	conditions	that	lead	to	scrapping.	He	faults	city	authorities	and	the	banks	for	foreclosing	and	kicking	people	out	of	their	houses,	resulting	in	thousands	of	vacant	homes	in	Detroit.	He	blames	a	legacy	of	corrupt	government	for	the	conditions	within	which	he	and	others	have	to	survive.		 Like	Bond,	Marsey	feels	her	actions	are	just	and	contextualizes	them	within	the	conditions	of	life	in	Detroit.	Marsey	gets	heated	when	talking	about	the	illegality	of	squatting:	The	city	don’t	care.	The	banks	don’t	care.	Nobody	cares.	Where	do	it	becomes	illegal?	Really?	But	yet	it’s	legal	for	drug	dealers	to	go	in	there…	It’s	legal	for	it	to	be	an	eyesore	to	the	community.	That’s	the	illegal	shit	allowing	it	to	be	legal…	And	instead	of	living	in	a	community	that’s	the	eyesore	to	itself	that	no	one	is	doing	nothing	about	and	it’s	been	obvious	for	the	past	10,	20	years	that	the	deterioration	of	the	situation,	but	no	one	on	a	corporate	level	is	concerned	with	that	issue;	at	some	point	the	people	whose	circumstances	it	is,	that	have	to	do	something	about	their	own	circumstances	especially	when	
                                                35	Detroit’s	City	Hall	used	to	be	called	the	City-County	building,	so	Detroiters	often	reference	city-county	for	a	general	nod	towards	local	government.	
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they’re	not	getting	help	from	people	that	can	make	the	change,	that	can	make	the	difference.		She	blames	institutions	and	authorities	for	the	difficult	conditions	within	which	she	must	try	to	survive:	the	city,	the	banks,	corporations,	those	“that	can	make	the	change”	are	not	doing	anything	to	help.	Institutions	and	authorities	have	failed	by	not	being	ethical	in	their	responsibility	towards	the	city.	This	failure	has	created	a	situation	of	desperation	for	residents	like	NAs,	and	as	one	who	cannot	“make	the	change,”	she	is	forced	to	act	for	herself	to	change	her	immediate	circumstances.	In	a	situation	of	desperation,	ensuring	one’s	own	survival	is	morally	justified.		 Soon	after	moving	into	a	squatted	house	with	her	nine	children	in	a	relatively	stable	neighborhood,	Marsey	had	a	run-in	with	the	police.	A	police	officer	arrested	her.36	She	explains	why	she	felt	her	treatment	was	unjust	by	countering	her	activities	with	what	she	considers	to	be	real	problems	worthy	of	authority	intervention:	That	wasn’t	a	situation	for	them	to	actually	get	caught	up	in.	When	you	got	murderers,	you	got	rapists,	you	got	bank	robberies,	you	got	so	many	other	domestic	violence	problems.	What	type	of	police	officer	take	a	woman	to	jail	who	trying	to	live	in	a	house	and	feed	her	kids,	and	have	some	place	to	[live]...	Really?	Really!		






















































































































                                                43	The	introduction	of	the	Blight	Report	explains	the	mission	the	task	force:	“In	September	2013,	the	Obama	Administration	convened	the	Detroit	Blight	Removal	Task	Force	to	develop	a	detailed	implementation	plan	to	remove	every	blighted	structure	and	clear	every	blighted	vacant	lot	in	the	City	of	Detroit	as	quickly	as	possible	using	an	environmentally-conscious	approach.	The	three	appointed	chairpersons	(Dan	Gilbert,	Glenda	Price	and	Linda	Smith)	led	a	team	of	experts	from	the	city,	state	and	federal	government,	public	and	private	sectors	and	the	foundation	community	to	collect	data	and	create	a	set	of	recommendations.	Their	findings	and	recommendations	were	shared	with	Detroit	Mayor	Mike	Duggan,	Emergency	Financial	Manager	Kevyn	Orr	and	Obama	Administration	representatives	on	May	27,	2014.”	(Blight	Report	2013:1)	
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abate	the	nuisance	(e.g.	tear	down	a	collapsed	front	porch).	If	they	do	not,	the	DLBA	legally	acquires	the	property	to	either	sell	via	auction	or	demolish.	The	DLBA	aims	to	make	un-wanted	property	available	for	interested	buyers,	and	to	demolish	neglected	properties	that	are	blighted.	Houses	around	the	city	are	auctioned	off	through	an	online	system	that	displays	photos,	addresses,	and	an	overview	of	expected	repairs.	Vacant	city-owned	side	lots	can	be	purchased	through	the	DLBA's	online	system	as	well.		 The	chapter	analyzes	both	legal	changes	(new	laws	and	ordinances)	and	recommendations	from	the	Blight	Removal	Task	Force	Report.	This	is	in	part	because	these	recommendations	come	from	a	highly	regarded	task	force	(put	together	by	the	Obama	Administration),	but	also	because	many	recommendations	from	this	report	are	included	in	Mayor	Duggan’s	“Every	Neighborhood	Has	A	Future”	plan	for	revitalizing	the	city.44	The	recommendations	analyzed	in	this	chapter	are	part	of	Detroit’s	new	regulatory	schema:	curbing	illegal	property	use	while	expanding	opportunities	for	legal	ownership.	This	schema	is	a	plan	or	blueprint	for	achieving	the	city	authorities’	goals	with	property.	Some	of	these	recommendations	are	in	the	process	of	being	adopted,	while	other	may	not	come	









                                                46	Associated	Press	and	Crain’s	Detroit	Business	Staff.	“Michigan	Senate	Oks	Scrap	Metal	Bill,	Snyder	Expected	to	Sign.”	Crain’s	Detroit	Business.	March	20,	2014.	<http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20140320/NEWS01/140329993/michigan-senate-oks-scrap-metal-bill-snyder-expected-to-sign>	Accessed	6/2/16.	47	This	law:	1)	restricts	payment	methods	for	certain	commonly	stolen	items	(like	copper	wiring),	requiring,	for	example,	that	payment	be	mailed	to	a	verified	address	rather	than	allowing	an	immediate	cash	payment	(section	445.426);	2)	creates	a	record	of	transactions	to	enable	law	enforcement	to	better	prosecute	scrappers	(section	445.427);	3)	makes	the	sale	or	purchase	of	certain	property	items	prohibited,	such	as	“public	fixtures”	like	
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addresses	problems	like	railroad	theft	in	rural	areas	of	Michigan.	In	Detroit	it	was	viewed	as	a	way	to	increase	regulation	of	scrapping	in	the	city	and	hopefully	decrease	its	harmful	effects	on	the	built	environment.		 A	Detroit	state	representative	who	spearheaded	the	bill	explained	that	the	primary	motivation	is	to	curb	the	harmful	effect	of	scrapping	on	the	built	environment	–	the	destruction	of	buildings	that	often	makes	it	cost-prohibitive	to	rehabilitate	them.48	Houses	or	buildings	left	empty	are	often	completely	scrapped	out	within	days	of	residents	vacating	–	sometimes	even	just	while	residents	are	away	on	vacation.	Three	key	components	to	this	new	form	of	regulation	are	that	the	law,	1)	only	targets	illegally	appropriated	property	that	is	sold	at	scrap	yards,	2)	makes	it	more	difficult	to	sell	illegally	acquired	property	and	imposes	harsher	punishments	for	doing	so,	and	3)	makes	it	harder	to	obtain	immediate	cash	in	exchange	for	scrapped	materials.	The	aim	is	to	curb	scrapping	that	is	considered	harmful	and	detrimental	to	the	city	housing	and	building	stock.	Both	Necessity	Appropriators	and	Lifestyle	Appropriators	take	materials	from	buildings,	but	only	NAs	try	to	sell	the	materials	at	scrapyards	for	quick	cash.	Rather	than	intervening	at	the	point	of	de	jure	property	theft,	this	law	targets	the	point	of	sale	at	scrap	yards,	which	impacts	only	Necessity	Appropriators’	practices.	This	law	makes	it	more	difficult	and	more	risky	for	NAs	











                                                51	Khalil	AlHajal,	“Detroit	looks	to	alert	property	owners,	trespassers	to	new	anti-squatting	laws.”	MLive.	October	13,	2014.	<http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2014/10/detroit_looks_to_alert_propert.html>	Accessed	6/2/16.	52	Interview	with	Barnabas,	October	4,	2013	53	Interview	with	Isaac	and	Cedric,	July	12,	2013	54	Interview	with	Marsey,	March	8,	2014;	Interview	with	Barnabas,	October	4,	2013.	
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	 However,	as	of	September	2014,	squatting	in	Michigan	is	now	a	misdemeanor	for	a	first	offense,55	and	a	felony	for	the	second	offense.56	Previously,	in	order	for	the	illegal	occupant	to	be	charged	with	a	criminal	offense	if	the	police	did	not	intervene	immediately,	the	legal	owner	had	to	file	trespassing	or	vandalism	charges	(Heise	2014).	This	new	law	also	allows	property	owners	to	take	more	direct	action	in	order	to	reassert	control	over	their	property.	They	are	now	allowed	to	“use	force	to	regain	possession	of	premises	occupied	by	a	squatter”	(Heise	2014).	This	does	not	authorize	assaulting	an	occupant,	but	property	owners	are	permitted	to	physically	remove	squatters’	belongings,	for	example.		 This	law	criminalizes	the	practices	of	all	illegal	occupiers	–	squatters	and	homesteaders	–	in	the	city	of	Detroit.	But	it	also	purports	to	make	it	easier	for	new	property	owners	to	take	possession	of	vacant	foreclosures	and	properties	purchased	at	auction.	In	order	to	attract	new	property	owners	to	Detroit,	the	city	must	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	protecting	property	rights.	Squatters	are	viewed	as	an	obstacle	to	property	auctions.	In	December	of	2013,	it	was	estimated	that	1,800	-	8,600	houses	held	by	the	Land	Bank	were	likely	occupied.57	New	owners	of	properties	purchased	via	auction	often	face	evicting	an	illegal	occupant	from	the	property.	This	new	law	aims	to	deter	all	illegal	




                                                58	For	squatted	properties	that	are	truly	unwanted	by	the	legal	owner	and	in	an	area	where	the	residents	do	not	mind	having	a	squatter	for	a	neighbor,	this	new	law	may	not	have	much	immediate	impact.	59	Sarah	Cox.	“There	Are	Some	New	Squatters	Laws	on	the	Books	in	Michigan.”	Curbed	Detroit.	August	18,	2014.	<http://detroit.curbed.com/2014/8/18/10059508/there-are-some-new-squatters-laws-on-the-books-in-michigan>	Accessed	6/2/16.	60	A	public	nuisance;	An	attractive	nuisance;	A	fire	hazard	or	is	otherwise	dangerous;	Has	had	the	utilities,	plumbing,	heating	or	sewerage	disconnected,	destroyed,	removed,	or	rendered	ineffective;	A	tax-reverted	property;	Owned	or	is	under	the	control	of	a	land	bank;	Has	been	vacant	for	five	consecutive	years,	and	not	maintained	to	code;	Has	code	violations	posing	a	severe	and	immediate	health	or	safety	threat	Using	the	State	of	Michigan’s	definition	of	“blighted	property”	as	a	starting	point,	the	Task	Force	added	elements	from	the	Detroit	Ordinance	governing	“dangerous	buildings.”	The	Task	Force’s	definition	includes	properties	that	are:	Open	to	the	elements	and	trespassing;	On	Detroit’s	Buildings,	Safety	Engineering,	and	Environmental	Department	(BSEED)	Demolition	list.	(CITE	blight	report)	
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latter	because	those	conditions	signal	that	the	legal	owner	is	still	watching	the	property.	Instead,	illegal	occupants	favor	tax	reverted	properties	and	land	bank	properties61	because	it	is	unlikely	that	they	will	be	evicted,	even	if	the	city	knows	that	illegal	occupants	are	there.62	Vacant	properties	that	squatters	can	take	over	often	lack	utilities,	and	are	not	maintained	to	code.	By	targeting	all	of	the	“blighted”	properties	in	the	city	for	demolition,	the	properties	that	squatters	and	homesteaders	rely	on	for	shelter	and	housing	are	being	removed	as	well.63		 The	second	important	component	of	the	Blight	Report	is	recommendation	5-4,	which	advocates	that	the	definition	of	an	“occupied”	property	be	redefined	to	include	only	“rightful	owners	or	tenants	and	exclude	squatters,”	(2014:111).	Currently,	a	property	is	defined	as	“occupied”	if	it	is	either	legally	or	illegally	occupied	–	i.e.	the	presence	of	homeowners,	squatters,	or	renters	all	constitute	a	property	as	legally	occupied.	An	occupied	property	cannot	be	demolished	under	Ordinance	290-H	in	Detroit.	Redefining	an	occupied	property	to	exclude	illegal	occupants	would	allow	properties	to	be	demolished	even	if	squatters	are	living	there.	This	recommendation	is	motivated	by	the	goal	of	quickly	
                                                61	Many	of	these	were	previously	owned	by	the	city	but	have	been	transferred	to	the	DLBA	after	Mayor	Duggan	took	office.	62	Prior	to	the	law’s	implementation,	city	official	Quentin	explained	that	the	city	could	not	afford	to	evict	all	of	the	squatters	in	city	owned	property	(Interview	with	Quentin,	October	22,	2013).	But	with	the	new	squatting	law,	the	city	has	other	tools	it	can	employ	to	remove	illegal	occupants.	63	It	is	questionable	how	long	it	will	actually	take	to	demolish	all	of	the	blighted	properties	in	the	city.	Currently,	the	city	reportedly	demolishes	about	200	per	week.	See	John	Gallagher,	“Detroit	blight	removal	campaign	ramps	up,	long	way	to	go.”	Detroit	Free	Press.	December	14,	2014.	<http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/michigan/2014/12/14/detroit-blight-duggan/20360959/>	Accessed	6/3/16	
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cleaning	up	neighborhoods	by	speeding	up	and	streamlining	the	demolition	process,	which	currently	is	very	drawn	out	and	cumbersome,64	and	often	delayed	by	the	presence	of	illegal	occupants.	The	drawback	of	this	recommendation	is	the	high	number	of	squatters	occupying	these	properties.	Recently,	one	of	the	three	major	demolition	companies	in	the	city	estimated	that	squatters	occupy	10%	of	the	homes	they	are	slated	to	demolish.65	If	that	estimate	held	true	for	all	three	major	Detroit	demolition	companies	(excluding	demo	companies	that	only	do	occasional	blight	removal	in	the	city),	that	would	mean	that	60	of	the	approximately	200	houses	demolished	every	week	in	Detroit	are	likely	occupied.		 This	recommendation	cuts	across	all	forms	of	illegal	occupation	–	squatters	and	homesteaders.	The	supply	of	“abandominiums”	(colloquial	term	for	squatted	properties)	is	already	shrinking	due	to	blight	demolition.	Squatters’	and	homesteaders’	tenure	in	illegally	occupied	properties	would	be	made	even	more	precarious	by	changing	the	definition	of	occupancy	to	allow	demolition	crews	to	tear	down	the	properties	they	occupy.		 But	LAs	are	more	able	to	navigate	around	this	obstacle	due	to	informal	differences	in	their	practices	and	the	resources	they	have	at	their	disposal.	Getting	properties	removed	from	the	demolition	list	is	possible,	but	it	requires	investing	time,	resources,	and	labor	to	substantially	improve	the	condition	of	the	property.	This	is	inconsistent	with	the	immediate	trajectory	of	Necessity	Appropriation	but	is	consistent	with	homesteaders’	








                                                66	Interview	with	Bobby,	February	11,	2014.	Interview	with	Lisa,	March	13,	2014.	
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6.	Growing	Detroit		 While	trying	to	make	properties	more	readily	accessible	to	urban	pioneering-types	and	rehabbers,	Detroit	is	also	being	marketed	as	a	city	that	embraces	urban	agriculture.	Detroiters	have	been	gardening	in	the	city	since	its	inception.	The	original	plot	lines	of	the	city	were	long	lots	that	stretched	down	to	the	river	so	that	farmers	could	water	their	crops.67	But	farming	and	gardening	are	also	being	"reintroduced"	(and	I	mean	this	ironically)	in	order	to	capture	the	DIY	culture	of	folks	who	are	disenchanted	by	consumer	culture	and	big	agriculture.	Urban	agriculture	in	Detroit	is	envisioned	as	a	way	to	make	use	of	all	the	vacant	land	in	the	city,	to	improve	the	health	of	local	residents,	to	entice	new	residents	who	seek	this	kind	of	lifestyle,	and	as	an	economic	stimulus.		 In	the	interest	of	bolstering	urban	agriculture	in	the	city,	Detroit’s	City	Council	adopted	an	urban	agriculture	zoning	ordinance	in	2013.	Guided	by	several	years	of	discovery	and	meetings	with	local	farmers,	this	ordinance	recognizes	agriculture	as	a	legitimate	land	use	in	the	city,	sets	standards	for	it,	and	defines	urban	agriculture	activities	(such	as	farm	versus	garden,	greenhouse	versus	hoophouse,	etc).	Agriculture	in	Michigan	is	protected	by	the	1981	Michigan	Right	to	Farm	Act	(MRFA),	which	was	designed	to	protect	farmers	from	nuisance	complaints	by	encroaching	suburban	residents.	But	it	also	restricted	municipalities	from	regulating	agriculture.	The	new	ordinance	in	Detroit	thus	had	to	work	with	farmers	in	order	to	create	a	framework	that	would	work	alongside	the	MRFA	and	its	Generally	Accepted	Agricultural	and	Management	Practices	(GAAMPS).	The	City	of	Detroit	Planning	Commission	reached	an	agreement	with	the	Michigan	Agricultural	Commission	to	
                                                67	Interview	with	Helena,	November	6,	2013.	
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provide	an	exemption	for	the	city	from	these	restrictions,	enabling	them	to	proceed	with	the	new	urban	agriculture	ordinance.		 Along	with	defining	acceptable	practices,	this	ordinance	defines	acceptable	agriculture	uses	not	previously	regulated	before	in	Detroit.	The	ordinance	includes	regulations	such	as	restricting	mature	production	of	oats,	rye	or	wheat	to	avoid	rodent	problems;	delineating	site	requirements	(such	as	how	far	back	a	compost	pile	must	be	from	the	road);	and	acceptable	forms	of	agriculture	(including	aquaculture,	aquaponics	and	hydroponics).	This	new	ordinance	also	regulates	the	sale	of	produce	and	other	farm	products	–	i.e.	farmer’s	markets.	It	also	permits	pre-existing	agricultural	operations	that	do	not	conform	to	new	requirements	as	a	“legal	non-conforming	use”	(Busdicker	2013).	For	example,	an	illegal	garden	that	has	a	built	structure	that	violated	regulations	could	be	permitted	as	a	“legal	non-conforming”	rather	than	requiring	that	the	garden	be	altered	to	fit	regulations.	This	incentivizes	legalization	(for	gardeners	to	purchase	their	plots	of	land)	because	this	non-conforming	status	excuses	them	from	significant	costs	to	comply	(like	moving	a	water	catchment	system	further	from	the	edge	of	the	property).		 Perhaps	most	significant	about	this	new	agriculture	ordinance	is	that	previously	residents	could	not	purchase	vacant	property	that	was	not	adjacent	to	their	legally	owned	residence	unless	they	planned	to	build	on	it.	Now	a	resident	can,	for	example,	purchase	the	vacant	lots	across	the	street	to	garden,	or	buy	a	vacant	block	in	another	neighborhood	to	start	a	farm	because	it	is	a	legally	regulated	use	of	property	in	the	city.68	Detroiters	can	now	legally	sell	their	produce	and	other	“agricultural	products.”	Residents	in	my	study	told	me	
                                                68	Interview	with	Helena,	November	6,	2013.	
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about	an	old	rent-a-lot	program	that	allowed	community	groups	and	residents	to	rent	lots	yearly	from	the	city	for	a	small	fee.69	But	they	also	noted	how	cumbersome	the	rental	process	was	because	city	officials	often	were	not	aware	of	the	program	or	could	not	find	the	necessary	rental	application.	70	These	residents	also	expressed	that	renting	lots	ultimately	was	not	worth	it	because	there	was	little	perceived	difference	in	precarity	between	renting	a	lot	and	illegally	occupying	it	to	farm,	and	more	headache	involved	with	the	former.71		 This	new	urban	agriculture	ordinance	formalizes	and	legalizes	the	practices	of	homesteaders	who	move	to	the	city	seeking	inexpensive	space	to	garden,	grow	their	own	food,	farm	for	a	living,	and	more	generally	“live	off	the	land”	akin	to	urban	pioneers.	Lots	can	be	purchased	through	the	city	for	as	little	as	$200	for	a	side-lot	and	for	“fair	market	value”	for	non-residence	adjacent	land	(Busdicker	2013,	3).	The	impact	is	that	Lifestyle	Appropriators	are	able	to	benefit	from	an	expanded	opportunity	for	property	ownership.	On	the	other	hand,	Necessity	Appropriators	in	my	study	lack	the	resources	(knowledge	and	financial)	to	start	and	maintain	agricultural	endeavors,	are	unable	to	carry	out	or	disinterested	in	the	manual	labor	of	farming,	and	do	not	have	the	level	of	stability	that	ensures	they	will	be	able	to	benefit	from	an	agricultural	endeavor.		

































                                                74	Vivian	S.	Toy.	“For	Parking	Space,	the	Price	Is	Right	at	$225,000.”	The	New	York	Times.	July	12,	2007.	<http://mobile.nytimes.com/2007/07/12/us/12parking.html>	Accessed	
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looking	for	spaces	to	land.	Middle	class	Detroiters	buy	property	for	their	children	for	graduation	gifts	instead	of	cars.75		 Property	access	and	control	can	play	a	key	role	in	neighborhood	stabilization	and	revitalization	as	a	way	for	improving	the	quality	of	life	for	existing	residents	and	to	draw	in	future	residents.	City	authorities	can	imagine	unique,	creative	plans	for	turning	the	space	of	the	city	from	a	liability	to	an	asset.	But	this	interstitial	space	is	not	blank	or	empty.	As	this	project	demonstrates	(and	as	“everyone	knows”	in	Detroit),	Detroit’s	vacant	and	abandoned	properties	are	used	in	various	illegal	and	informal	ways.	As	such,	re-using	this	space	in	alternative	ways	requires	grappling	with	and	confronting	what	already	exists.		 The	pitfalls	of	property	in	Detroit	come	from	the	fact	that	the	heterogeneous	forms	of	illegal,	informal	property	use	do	not	easily	map	onto	dominant	legal	property	relations.	The	outcomes	of	transforming	the	often	vast	spaces	of	informality	in	declining	cities	are	as	yet	unknown.	Existing	scholarship	on	urban	transformation	has	established	that,	in	various	ways,	the	“benefits”	of	gentrification	are	paired	with	negative	impacts	often	shouldered	by	poorer	long-time	residents.	The	lynchpin	in	the	presumed	paradisal	ascendency	of	"revitalization"	is	displacement:	residents	get	forced	out	or	priced	out	of	existing	neighborhoods	as	new	residents	and	an	influx	of	capital	push	them	to	less	expensive	peripheral	neighborhoods.	This	explanation	rests	on	increasing	economic	value	of	property,	and	enforced	legal	property	relations	that	allow	certain	individuals	the	power	to	




	 Instead,	Matsuda	argues	that,	"One	needs	to	ask	who	has	the	real	interest	and	the	most	information?"	(Matsuda	1987:346).	Planning	for	urban	decline	and	improving	the	conditions	of	life	in	these	cities	must	grow	from	the	grassroots	practices	and	tactical-strategies	(see	Lugones	2003)	of	residents	who	are	rooted	in	the	conditions	of	life	in	Detroit	–	not	just	civically-minded	outsiders	who	want	to	be	part	of	the	rebirth	of	Detroit	and	for	whom	the	city	is	a	different	beast.	Even	long-time	residents	who	have	the	stability	and	ability	to	participate	in	local	governance	may	have	interests	drastically	different	from	Necessity	Appropriators	and	other	very	marginalized	locals.		 Roy	(2005,	148)	argues	that	planners	concerned	with	distributive	justice	must	recognize	that	“dealing	with	informality	requires	recognizing	the	“right	to	the	city”	–	claims	and	appropriations	that	do	not	fit	neatly	into	the	ownership	model	of	property…”	Most	property	scholarship	debates	the	benefits	and	disadvantages	of	privately	owned	versus	communal	property.	Some	informal,	communal-property-like	alternatives	are	evident	in	Detroit	–	such	as	community	gardens	and	collective	responsibility	for	vacant	urban	spaces.	Many	of	the	various	informal	property	claims	in	Detroit	do	not	fit	neatly	into	either	private	or	communal	property	ownership	models.	This	is	in	part	due	to	the	different	temporalities	with	which	appropriators	relate	to	their	properties.		 The	future	(in)equality	in	declining	cities	may	revolve	around	the	ardent	focus	on	long-term	property	relations,	not	just	private	versus	communal	property.	Property	laws	codify	long-term	relationships	to	property,	and	this	does	not	fit	the	needs	of	all	poor	residents	(and	there	are	a	lot	of	them	in	economically	disadvantaged	cities	like	Detroit).	Truly	creative,	locally	responsive	strategies	for	handling	property	and	improving	urban	conditions	in	Detroit	would	create	legal	opportunities	for	short-term,	urgent,	immediate	
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property	use	by	residents	needing	a	“stepping	stone.”	Urban	authorities	in	cities	like	Detroit	might	consider	programs	akin	to	the	United	Kingdom’s	“authorized	squat”	wherein	legal	owners	are	relieved	of	liability	and	maintenance	responsibilities,	and	squatters	are	allowed	to	inhabit	the	property	(see	Kearns	1979	for	discussion).	This	might	be	more	beneficial	for	Detroit	than	an	ardent	reliance	on	dominant	property	relations	as	it	could	help	to	stabilize	Detroit’s	poorest	residents	and	improve	neighborhood	conditions.	Improving	conditions	of	life	for	all	residents	is	not	only	a	just	goal;	it	is	of	practical	importance	for	declining	cities.	Retaining	existing	residents	and	addressing	the	conditions	that	contribute	to	crime	and	blight	also	help	to	attract	new	residents,	thereby	slowing	down	or	stabilizing	population	decline.		 Towards	this	end,	revitalization	plans	should	consider	how	to	make	the	city	accessible	to	and	supportive	of	the	least	well	off	by	creating	avenues	for	formalization	that	serve	the	same	function	as	informal	practices.	Central	to	bringing	such	a	goal	to	fruition	is	a	comprehensive	knowledge	of	social	life	in	the	context	of	urban	decline.	Without	an	empirical,	grass-roots	understanding	of	the	informal	practices	that	arise	in	such	places,	plans	for	improvement	may	do	little	more	than	gentrify	these	cities	through	new	mechanisms	of	exclusion,	displacement,	or	erasure.	On	the	other	hand,	the	lack	of	interest	by	profit-seeking	entrepreneurs	in	declining	cities	facilitates	creative	methods	for	improving	the	conditions	of	life	therein.	Cultivating	strategies	that	build	from	informal	practices	may	also	be	an	opportunity	to	realize	what	David	Harvey	(2008)	claims	is	the	real	issue	at	stake	in	the	Right	to	the	City	Movement:	i.e.	not	only	just	and	equitable	access	to	the	city	and	its	resources,	but	the	ability	for	all	citizens	to	be	active	participants	in	reshaping	and	transforming	the	city.		
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